,→ subject to
• The ICC can be written as e = h − l c ,→ note that it must be that h > l • Substituting for e the problem becomes
• The value of e implied by the optimal contract: Assume the LLC binds (otherwise eviction has no effect)
• Expected lifetime utility from choosing e today:
,→ the first-order condition yields
• It is optimal for the landlord to set ϕ = 1 and ψ = 0. Why ?
• In a stationary equilibrium V 0 = V and so expected Tenant utility is
,→ this can be re-written as
,→ the stationary contract must offer this to be incentive compatible ,→ substituting these in we get
,→ the more surplus the Tenant gets, the more effort is required by the Landlord Note.-t-statistics are in parentheses. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
